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I. Introduction 
For the past few years, the European Union (“EU”) has been 
grappling with an influx of immigrants, particularly Syrian 
refugees.1  From the United Kingdom2 to Sweden to the Czech 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law.  The author would 
like to thank the North Carolina Journal of International Law editors and staff members 
for their hard work in making this publication a reality. 
 1 See Reuters, Immigrant population hits new high in Germany, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-immigration/immigrant-population-
hits-new-high-in-germany-idUSKBN1AH3EP [https://perma.cc/Y5D5-9RUS]. 
 2 For the purposes of this Note, assume the United Kingdom is still within the EU. 
As of this writing, Brexit has not yet occurred. See Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: 
All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2018), 
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Republic, the influx has become an increasingly prevalent political 
issue.3  However, this is not a new issue for the EU.4  Since 1999, 
the EU has attempted to establish a set of uniform asylum rules for 
its member states with the establishment of the Common European 
Asylum System (“CEAS”).5  In furtherance of this objective, the EU 
proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (“the Charter”), which would establish the overall framework 
of the legislation.6 
This Note will examine a recent European Court of Justice case, 
K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie,7  and its 
interpretation of the Charter’s relation to EU law and policy.  First, 
it will delve into a brief background of the CEAS and the facts of 
the case.  Second, it will explore the applicable European laws and 
their current applications.  Third, it will analyze how the European 
Court of Justice has imposed another limitation on the exercise of a 
third-party national’s right to liberty under the Charter, while 
striking a proper balance between state and applicant interests.  
Finally, this Note will look to the likely future consequences of the 
ruling, and the potential fallout had the European Court of Justice 
 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/8YG2-AYXR]. 
 3 See Johan Ahlander & Mansoor Yosufzai, Sweden intensifies crackdown on illegal 
immigrants, REUTERS (July 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-
immigration-crackdown/sweden-intensifies-crackdown-on-illegal-immigrants-
idUSKBN19Y0G8 [https://perma.cc/M44U-HY7D]; REUTERS, Britons want to see 
immigration controlled: PM May, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-immigration-may/britons-want-to-see-
immigration-controlled-pm-may-idUSKCN1BH1K7 [https://perma.cc/4BLF-4F5C]; 
Nikodem Chinowski, Beyond Borders: Immigration Within the EU, EMERGING EUROPE 
(Oct. 8, 2017), http://emerging-europe.com/interviews/beyond-borders-immigration-
within-eu/ [https://perma.cc/LNN4-EVBL]. 
 4 Anthony Faiola, A global surge in refugees leaves Europe struggling to cope, 




 5 CÉLINE BAULOZ, MELTEM INELI-CIGER, & SARAH SINGER, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: SELECTED PROTECTION ISSUES RAISED BY THE SECOND PHASE OF THE 
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM 34 (2015). 
 6 Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations under the Common 
European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
217, 229–30 (2013).  
 7 K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-18/16, [2017] E.C.J.1 
(CELEX No. 616CJ0018) [hereinafter K Case]. 
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ruled in the alternative. 
II. K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie 
A. General Overview 
K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie arises from a 
detention action brought in a District Court of the Hague, 
Netherlands.8  Mr. K and the Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en 
Justitie (State Secretary for Security and Justice, Netherlands) 
referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union to 
determine whether Mr. K’s detention under Directive 2013/33/EU 
was valid under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.9  
The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction over the issue, as it 
is a question of interpreting EU law and the potential annulment of 
a EU legal act.10 
In late November 2015, Mr. K boarded a plane in Vienna, 
Austria, bound for Amsterdam, Netherlands.11  However, 
Amsterdam was merely a connection point for Mr. K.12  His 
eventual destination was Edinburgh, United Kingdom.13  During 
boarding procedures for the Edinburgh flight, Mr. K was suspected 
of using a fake passport, then subsequently detained and charged in 
a Dutch criminal court.14 
It was determined that Mr. K was not a Dutch citizen, nor was 
he a citizen of any European Union member state.15  After the 
criminal action was dismissed and Mr. K released, he applied for 
asylum in the Netherlands.16  The Dutch authorities then detained K 
once again, stating they needed to determine his actual identity and 
 
 8 See id. 
 9 Id. ¶ 1–2, 23; See Council Directive 2013/33, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96 (EU) 
[hereinafter Directive 2013/33/EU]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, art. 6, Oct. 26, 2012 (C 326/391) [hereinafter Charter]. 
 10 What does the CJEU do?, European Union (last visited Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en 
[https://perma.cc/EPY4-A7A9]. 
 11 K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 17. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. ¶ 18–19. 
 15 See id. ¶ 17. 
 16 Id. ¶ 20. 
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that K was a flight risk.17  Consequently, Mr. K challenged his 
detention, arguing it violated Article 6 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.18 
B. Common European Asylum System 
It is necessary to explain the European Union asylum process, 
as this case hinges on the interpretation of its purpose and 
application.19  In 1999, at a meeting in Tampere, Finland, the 
European Council decided to create a broad-sweeping uniform 
scheme on asylum in its member states.20  The objective was to 
“reconcil[e] the universal interests of asylum seekers as stated in EU 
policy documents with the particular interest of the EU or its 
Member States.”21 
To this end, the prevailing principle was to ensure “nobody is 
sent back to persecution,” otherwise known as the principle of non-
refoulement.22  The system was meant to provide clear 
determinations for which Member State was responsible for the 
application, the common procedures that would be followed, 
minimum conditions of retainer, and rules on refugee status.23 
In addition, the Council took a stance that “third-party 
nationals,” like Mr. K, must be granted fair treatment, especially in 
the face of racism and xenophobia.24  To this end, the Council called 
for “[a] more vigorous integration policy . . . granting [third-party 
nationals] rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens.”25  For Member States, the Council instructed that any 
decisions made must factor in each State’s capacity for asylum 
seekers and the relationship of that State to the applicant’s country 
of origin.26 
 
 17 K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 20. 
 18 Id. ¶ 23. 
 19 See id. ¶ 32 
 20 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999) 
[hereinafter Presidency Conclusions] [https://perma.cc/DH32-98AX]; see BAULOZ, supra 
note 5, at 35. 
 21 BAULOZ, supra note 5, at 35. 
 22 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 20. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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However, in the past 18 years, CEAS has never truly come to 
fruition.27  Instead, a series of directives and regulations have 
established the general framework that governs asylum applicant 
rights.28   
III. European Asylum Law 
A. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, or the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”), is the overarching 
agreement in the European Union for the protection of human 
rights, including the rights of asylum seekers.29  All Member States 
of the EU are required to accede to the Convention, and the EU 
itself, as an entity, was required to become a party under the 2009 
Treaty of Lisbon.30  In addition to enumerating the rights and 
freedoms under the EU, the Convention also establishes the 
European Court of Human Rights.31  Under Article 34 of the ECHR, 
access to the Court of Human Rights extends to “any person . . . 
claiming to be the victim of a [human rights] violation by one of the 
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention.”32  
Furthermore, any ruling by the Court of Human Rights will be 
binding on the parties, thus ensuring these rights are properly 
respected.33 
Of those rights, perhaps one of the most important is the Right 
to Liberty and Security, as enumerated in Article 5.34  Under this 
Article, every person not only has a right to be informed of the 
 
 27 See Ulrich Becker & Julia Hagn, Reform of the European Asylum System: Why 
Common Social Standards are Imperative, 14 J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS, at 21–
26 (2016). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Thus, the name. See Langford, supra note 6, at 227. 
 30 Id. at 227. 
 31 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, § II, 
June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. 194 [hereinafter ECHR]; see Langford, supra note 6, at 22. 
 32 ECHR, supra note 31, § II, art. 34. 
 33 Court in Brief, EUR. CT. FOR HUM. RTS., 
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court&c= (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/CYW2-8NH4]. 
 34 ECHR, supra note 31, § I, art. 5. 
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reasons for his or her detention, but also has the right to be free from 
any detention.35  However, there are six exceptions to this right.36  
These exceptions are for lawful detentions: (1) after conviction, (2) 
for non-compliance with a court order, (3) to be brought before a 
court on reasonable suspicion, (4) of a minor for educational 
supervision, (5) for quarantine, and (6) those in deportation or 
extradition actions.37  Thus, it is only when exercising proper law 
enforcement functions that a Member State may detain one of its 
own citizens, a citizen of another Member State, or a third-party 
national.38 
B. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
A year after the ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (“the Charter”) was announced in Nice, 
France.39  However, the Charter lacked binding legal authority at the 
time.40  This changed in 2009 at the Treaty of Lisbon, when the 
Charter was changed to become the binding embodiment of the 
ECHR.41  It is now part of EU primary-law and is enforceable in 
every court and at all levels of the judicial system in the EU.42 
The Charter is split into seven chapters: Dignity, Freedoms, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, Justice, and General 
Provisions.43  Notably, the Charter explicitly provides the right to 
asylum and the right to liberty for all, including non-European 
Union citizens and persons.44  Within the Freedoms Chapter, Article 
18 provides, “[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due 
respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 . . . 
and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”45  Whereas, 
 
 35 Id. § I, art. 5. 
 36 Id. § I, art. 5. 
 37 Id. § I, art. 5. (1)(a)-(f). 
 38 See id. § I, art. 5. 
 39 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty 
of Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 645, 645–82 (2011). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Langford, supra note 6, at 229. 
 43 See Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96. 
 44 See id. at art. 5, 18; see Langford, supra note 6, at 230. 
 45 Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96, at art. 18. 
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Article 6 provides “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security 
of person.”46 
Article 52 of the Charter defines the scope of these rights.47  
Article 52(1) provides: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.48 
Thus, each Member State, and the EU as an entity, must 
acknowledge the rights within the Charter and only limit them in a 
direct, legislative manner. Additionally, Article 52(3) explicitly 
encompasses the ECHR: 
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
Guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing 
more extensive protection.49 
Given these three Articles, Articles 18, 6, and 52, European law 
creates very broad rights for those that seek asylum within the 
Union’s borders.50  Seekers have an express right to liberty, and that 
right cannot be limited unless made by a very narrowly tailored 
law.51  Furthermore, the EU has enacted certain directives and 
regulations to provide guidance for Member States and asylum 
seekers at each step of the way, as discussed below.52 
C. The Four Pillars of Asylum53 
EU asylum law—the Charter and the ECHR—sits on four 
 
 46 Id., at art. 6 (emphasis added). 
 47 See id. at art. 52. 
 48 Id. at art. 52(1). 
 49 Id. at art. 52(3). 
 50 See id. at arts. 6, 18, 52. 
 51 See Charter, supra note 9, O.J. (L 180) 96, at art. 6, 18, 52. 
 52 See Becker, supra note 27, at 21. 
 53 See id. 
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pillars, which have been modified and reformed over the years.54  
These four pillars are the Qualification Directive, Asylum 
Protections Directive, Reception Directive, and the Dublin III 
Regulation.55 
1. Qualification Directive 
The Qualification Directive, Directive 2011/95/EU, was 
enacted in 2011.56  Its objectives were “to establish standards for the 
granting of international protection to third-country nationals and 
stateless person[s], for a uniform status for refugees . . .  and for the 
content of the protection granted.”57  Consisting of 42 articles, 
Directive 2011/95/EU notably enumerates the assessment criteria 
for asylum applications.58  Article 4 states: 
(1) [It is] the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible 
all the elements needed to substantiate the application for 
international protection . . . 
(2) The elements  . . .  consist of the applicant’s statements and all 
the documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the 
applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, 
identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous 
residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel 
documents and the reasons for applying for international 
protection.59 
Thus, Directive 2011/95/EU gives Member States a broad 
outline of what is required in each asylum application.  
Additionally, it places the onus on the applicant to provide this 
information to the Member State, ensuring a cooperative process.  
This is only the first step.60 
2. Asylum Procedures Directive 
The Asylum Procedures Directive, Directive 2013/32/EU, 
 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 21–22. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Directive 2011/95/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council, 2011 O.J. 
(L 337) 9, ¶ 49 (EU) [hereinafter Directive 2011/95/EU]. 
 58 Id. at art. 4. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Becker, supra note 27, at 22. 
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enumerates the process for granting or removing asylum.61  Notably, 
it gives explicit definitions for “applicant,” “refugee,” and “remain 
in member state.”62  Furthermore, in Article 9, the Directive 
explicitly grants: “[a]pplicants shall be allowed to remain in the 
Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the 
determining authority has made a decision.”63 Thus, an applicant 
knows they at least have temporary protection within the Member 
State.  Member States also know their duty to the applicant while 
they determine the final decision on the asylum application.64  
Again, this emphasizes a cooperative process actively involving the 
applicant in each step along the way.65 
3. Reception Directive 
The Reception Directive, Directive 2013/33/EU, provides the 
exact standards for the reception of asylum applicants.66  It allows 
for the detention of applicants, but only for a set of specified 
reasons.67  Principally, an applicant cannot be held simply because 
he or she is an applicant.68  A State can only detain an applicant 
when: (a) determining an applicant’s identity, (b) determining 
application elements that could not be obtained outside of detention, 
especially if there is a risk of flight, (c) determining an applicant’s 
right to enter the territory of the State, (d) in the event of extradition 
or intentional delay of the extradition process, (e) when national 
security requires it, or (f) as another Member State requires for their 
own application process.69  Thus, the Member State knows the 
proper and adequate process it can use.70  This both adequately 
protects the rights and interests of the applicant, while 
simultaneously insuring the State’s own interest in the proper 
processing of a valid application.71 
 
 61 See id. at 22. 
 62 Directive 2013/32, EU, supra note 9, at art. 2. 
 63 Id. at art. 9(1). 
 64 Id. at art. 10. 
 65 Id. at art. 13. 
 66 See Becker, supra note 27, at 22. 
 67 Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 9, at art. 8(3). 
 68 Id. at art. 8(1). 
 69 Id. at art. 8(3)(a)-(f). 
 70 Id. at art. 8(1)-(3). 
 71 Id. at art. 8(1)-(3). 
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4.  Dublin III Regulation72 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, otherwise known as the Dublin 
III Regulation, establishes which Member State is responsible for 
processing an asylum application.73  The regulation both requires 
the Member State to review any application made in their 
territory—including the border or transit areas—and also to inform 
the applicant of the criteria and provide a personal interview.74 
From these four pillars, the Qualification Directive, the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, the Reception Directive, and the Dublin III 
Regulation, EU law clearly establishes a well detailed process for 
asylum applications.75  Member States are informed of their duties 
and the proper ways of processing the applications.76  Applicants are 
informed of the necessary steps and information.77  While each 
Member State may have some slight variance on the exact steps and 
required information, the generalities are clearly enumerated.78  This 
gives courts a solid foundation to build upon when determining the 
proper outcome when an issue like Mr. K’s arises.79 
IV. Striking the Balance 
In the case at hand, K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, Mr. K challenged the legality of Directive 2013/33/EU 
Article 8(3) in the light of the Charter’s Article 6.80  Simply put, Mr. 
K is challenging the Reception Directive’s detention provision, 
especially when no extradition proceedings are underway.81  He 
argued that Article 6 of the Charter— “[e]veryone has the right to 
 
 72 The Dublin Regulation is contentious and thoroughly written about. However, as 
it has no bearing on the case at hand, I will not be elaborating on it. For further information 
on the Dublin Regulation, see SAMANTHA VELLUTI, REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM SYSTEM — LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURTS (2013); Langford, supra note 6, at 264. 
 73 See Becker, supra note 27, at 22. 
 74 Commission Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31, arts. 3–4 [hereinafter 
Regulation 604/2013/EU]. 
 75 See Becker, supra note 27, at 21–22. 
 76 See Regulation 604/2013/EU, supra note 74, at art. 3. 
 77 See id. at art. 4. 
 78 See id. at art. 3–4. 
 79 See id. at art. 3–4. 
 80 K, supra note 7, ¶ 23. 
 81 Id. ¶ 33. 
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liberty and security of person”82  —prohibits his detention in the 
Netherlands.  The Court of Justice held Article 8(3) fits within the 
Charter, as it only allows detention in scenarios where the State 
interest rests in the requirements of processing the application.83  
The court explicitly states, “[the] EU legislature struck a fair 
balance between . . . the applicant’s right to liberty and . . . the 
requirements relating to the identification of that applicant or of his 
nationality, or to the determination of the elements on which his 
application is based.”84 
A. Applicant vs. State Interests 
At its core, the case is determined by a balancing of interests. 
Indeed, the Court of Justice explicitly recognizes “limitations on the 
exercise of the right [to liberty enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter] 
must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.”85 Here, the Court 
of Justice has imposed a limitation on an asylum seeker’s exercise 
of the right to liberty, while striking a balance between the liberty 
interest and the State’s interest in ensuring proper application 
procedure.86 
The most obvious liberty interest is Mr. K’s interest to be free 
from detention.  The court notes there is precedent for this.87  In 
Nabil and Others v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights 
held that “any deprivation of liberty [under the second limb of 
Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR] will be justified only for as long as 
deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress.  If such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention 
will cease to be permissible under Article 5(1)(f) [of the ECHR].”88  
As noted above, this article of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is encompassed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.89  
However, the noted difference is that while Article 5 of the 
Convention creates the specifics of the right to liberty and security, 
 
 82 Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6. 
 83 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 49. 
 84 See id. ¶ 49. 
 85 See id. ¶ 40. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. ¶ 27. 
 88 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 27; Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2015). 
 89 See Douglas-Scott, supra note 39. 
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including in extradition or deportation scenarios,90  Article 6 of the 
Charter merely states, “everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person.”91 
However, Article 52 of the Charter, provides that all rights in 
the ECHR are within the scope of the Charter’s enumerated rights.92  
Yet, the Court of Justice rejects expanding the Charter to include 
5(1)(f), stating “The fundamental right to liberty guaranteed in 
Article 6 of the Charter has the same meaning as in Article 5 of the 
ECHR, although the latter does not form part of the EU acquis” and 
“[t]he ‘ . . . limitations which may legitimately be imposed on the 
exercise of the rights laid down in Article 6 of the Charter may not 
exceed those permitted by the ECHR.”93  In doing so, they decline 
to follow Nabil, and instead venture on their own balancing test of 
the involved interests.94 
For their analysis, the Court of Justice adheres to the view that 
a person’s right to liberty should rarely be infringed upon.95  
Accordingly, one may think the Court would hold that K’s 
detention, absent a legal proceeding against him, would be a 
violation of the Charter.  However, while admitting there were no 
extradition proceedings against K, the Court of Justice found the 
Member State’s interest to be compelling enough to hold the 
detention was lawful.96 
To find such, the Court looked to the principle of 
proportionality.97  This principle requires that State measures do not 
“exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
attain the legitimate objectives pursued.”98  Applying this principle 
to Directive 2013/33/EU Article 8(3), the Court of Justice held the 
 
 90 ECHR, supra note 31, at §1, art. 5(f). 
 91 Charter, supra note 9, at art. 6. 
 92 See id. at art. 52. 
 93 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 49. 
 94 See id. ¶ 49–81. 
 95 See id. ¶ 57. 
 96 See id. ¶ 64, 91. 
 97 See id. ¶ 57. 
 98 Id. ¶ 57. A close American companion to this principle would perhaps be the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of strict scrutiny. Note the goal must be legitimate, and the 
means must not exceed what is necessary to accomplish that goal, thus a narrow approach. 
See Strict Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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legitimate State objective was the proper functioning of the CEAS.99  
The measure to achieve this objective—the detention—is grave, 
however Article 9(1) of the Directive limits the adverse effects on 
Mr. K.100  The Article states “[a]n applicant shall be detained only 
for as short a period as possible and shall be kept in detention only 
for as long as the grounds set out in Article 8(3) are applicable.”101  
Thus, Mr. K could only be held by the Netherlands for as long as it 
took ensure its asylum process was proceeding properly.102  Once it 
was determined that Mr. K was who he said he was, he would have 
to be released or extradited.103 
Here, where Mr. K was held only as long as necessary to 
ascertain his identity for the asylum process, the State’s detention 
powers have been properly checked.104  While his right to liberty has 
been severely diminished, it was both for a legitimate reason—the 
asylum he requested—and for a limited time—the time needed to 
ascertain his true identity, rather than the fake one he provided at 
the airport.  Thus, the Court of Justice struck the proper balance 
between the two interests.105  It is true that Mr. K could be held 
longer, but not without good cause (such as a lawful detention for 
extradition).  Furthermore, the Netherlands has been checked, but 
without being limited in function.  Mr. K may be unhappy, but it 
appears that justice was properly administrated. 
B. Likely Consequences 
While the Court of Justice struck a reasonable balance between 
the two conflicting interests, there are still some potential far-
reaching consequences.106  The most notable consequence is the 
disregard of the ECHR’s specifics and Article 52 of the Charter.107  
 
 99 See K, supra note 7, ¶ 54–59. 
 100 See id. ¶ 57. 
 101 Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 9, at art. 9(1). 
 102 See id. at art. 9(1). 
 103 See K Case, supra note 7, ¶ 73. 
 104 See id. ¶ 72–73. 
 105 See id. ¶ 87. 
 106 See Bernard Andonian, The difficulty of refusing protection to an EU national, 
Gulbenkin Andonian (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.gulbenkian.co.uk/the-difficulty-of-
refusing-protection-to-an-eu-national/ [https://perma.cc/BL4J-75SN]. 
 107 See Rights of Residence, The UK Law Societies’ Joint Brussels Office, (May 31, 
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Article 52(3) explicitly states, 
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing 
more extensive protection. (emphasis added)108 
This creates two issues.  First, this sets a precedent of ignoring 
the ECHR.  While the Court of Justice is correct in noting the ECHR 
is not a legally binding document for the EU,109 it still provides the 
basic framework for the protections of human rights in the European 
Union.  The ECHR is essentially a “Bill of Rights” for the EU.110  
To disregard the protections mentioned within—particularly those 
related to extradition and deportation—is to disregard basic rights 
that are demanded for citizens and third-party nationals.  There is a 
potential for hypocrisy, with the courts saying the rights must be 
protected, and simultaneously ignoring the enumerated specifics of 
those rights. 
In this case, where there were no extradition proceedings in the 
works,111  the protections of ECHR’s Article 5, as encompassed in 
the Charter’s Article 6, would grant Mr. K a solid, valid claim.  Why 
should he be detained if the detention is not for one of the specified 
purposes? Based on European asylum law, he should not.112 
Admittedly, Mr. K. is in this predicament because of his own 
actions (fake passport and applying for asylum),113 but the denial of 
his right to liberty sets a dangerous precedent for other asylum 
seekers.  This precedent could even be viewed as catastrophic as 
Europe struggles to answer its refugee crisis, particularly in less 
forgiving nations, or those where public opinion has swung against 
immigrants.114  Asylum seekers could potentially be detained for a 
“limited time as necessary,” but with no guarantees that said limited 
time is indeed limited.  Nor is there a guarantee that those seeking 
asylum will regain their freedom in a territory in which they wish to 
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reside, travel, or be protected.  Even worse, the “applicable 
grounds” could change.  This is not to suggest the Member States 
of the European Union are a set of dystopic police states, focused 
on indefinitely detaining third-party nationals.115  Yet, if the original 
grounds were for asylum verification, then changed to extradition 
purposes, and then changed to a criminal context, the one who was 
originally seeking protection could very well be detained for an 
unreasonable time period.116 
On the other hand, the Member State does have the legitimate 
objective of ensuring those they grant asylum to are who they say 
they are.117  This not only protects their citizens, but also ensures 
proper assessment of the application.  Thus, the State is juggling the 
dual interests of their citizens’ protection and the speedy conclusion 
of the asylum process.118  Without detention, these interests may 
never be truly satisfied.  Detention grants the State a kind of 
insurance against any potential “dangerous activity”119 of the 
asylum seeker, and the knowledge of the seeker’s location, allowing 
for quick verification of information during the asylum process.120 
The second issue with disregarding the ECHR and Article 52 of 
the Charter arises from the last sentence of Article 52.  This sentence 
grants Member States the ability to increase the level of protection 
for asylum seekers.121  Thus, the Netherlands could always enact 
laws to give Mr. K further protections while applying for asylum.  
Perhaps, give him further legal rights or changes in the level of 
detention. 
However, with the Court of Justice’s ruling, there is no incentive 
to even codify the ECHR’s provisions at the national level.122  If 
Member States are aware that courts will not look to the ECHR or 
Article 52 of the Charter when making determinations on the scope 
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of these rights, but will rather attempt to interpret or expand other 
Charter articles, it follows that they would push litigation to create 
a scope that favors state interests.123  Yet, as structured as the EU is, 
this piecemeal litigation may prove to only muddle the rights. 
V. Conclusion 
In conclusion, K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie 
creates a reasonable balancing of liberty and State interests, but may 
have adverse consequences on the clarity of rights in the EU.  The 
balancing of Mr. K’s right to liberty with the necessity of properly 
assessing his application for asylum is objectively reasonable.  Not 
only does the Court of Justice afford great deference to the right, it 
also ensures Member State power is checked.  It realizes how 
important the right is, and makes sure the detention is both based in 
good cause and has a temporal limit. 
However, by disregarding the scope of the right based on the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the Court 
of Justice has opened a door that may allow the enumerated rights 
to be curtailed.  It may become necessary for the Court of Justice to 
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